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Abstract—The smart grid combines the classical power system
with information technology, leading to a cyber-physical system.
In such an environment the malicious injection of data has
the potential to cause severe consequences. Classical residual-
based methods for bad data detection are unable to detect well
designed false data injection (FDI) attacks. Moreover, most work
on FDI attack detection is based on the linearized DC model
of the power system and fails to detect attacks based on the
AC model. The aim of this paper is to address these problems
by using the graph structure of the grid and the AC power
flow model. We derive an attack detection method that is able to
detect previously undetectable FDI attacks. This method is based
on concepts originating from graph signal processing (GSP).
The proposed detection scheme calculates the graph Fourier
transform of an estimated grid state and filters the graph’s high-
frequency components. By comparing the maximum norm of
this outcome with a threshold we can detect the presence of FDI
attacks. Case studies on the IEEE 14-bus system demonstrate that
the proposed method is able to detect a wide range of previously
undetectable attacks, both on angles and on magnitudes of the
voltages.
Index Terms—Graph signal processing (GSP), graph Fourier
transform, bad data detection, false data injection (FDI), cyber-
physical system
ABBREVIATIONS
AC Alternating current
DC Direct current
DSP Digital signal processing
FDI False data injection
GFT Graph Fourier transform
GHPF Graph high-pass filter
GSP Graph signal processing
ICT Information and communication technology
PMU Phasor measurement unit
PSSE Power system state estimation
SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vulnerability of critical infrastructures to cyber at-tacks is a major threat to the stability and safety of
our society [1]. One of the most critical infrastructures is
the power system, as almost all other infrastructures depend
on it [2]. In particular, smart grids that combine classical
power system components with advanced information and
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communication technology (ICT) to build a cyber-physical
system are considered to be particularly vulnerable, due to
(among other reasons) dedicated attacks [3]–[6].
Research on power system operation is used to develop
methods to cope with physical faults or disturbances in power
systems, such as outages [7], off-nominal frequencies [8], and
voltage imbalances [9], [10]. However, the development of
methods to handle and mitigate the effects of cyber attacks in
power systems is a rather new field, and traditional security
measures originating from the ICT domain are considered to
be insufficient against this growing danger [11].
In this paper, we consider the problem of detection of
false data injection (FDI) attacks, in which it is assumed that
attackers can compromise the measurements of the grid. Such
FDI attacks aim to affect the power system state estimation
(PSSE). The state of a power system is generally defined
as the voltage values on all the buses of the system. The
PSSE is part of the regular control routines that are hosted in
the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
of the control center of the grid operator. It provides the
input for multiple monitoring and control purposes, including
security assessment, load forecasting, dispatching, reliability
analysis, and economic considerations [12], [13]. In particular,
the modern power system, which is often operated near its
operational limits for economic reasons, cannot be operated
without a reliable PSSE. Thus, the impact of FDI attacks could
be manifold and range from economic consequences, through
overloading and physical damage, to serious human hazard
[14]–[16]. The PSSE is usually equipped with methods to
detect random false data and faults that are based on residuals
(see, e.g. [17], [18] and Ch. 5 in [12]). However, it was shown
in [19] that if the attacker has sufficient knowledge of the
system topology, a well-designed attack can pass the residual-
based bad data detector and perturb the PSSE to any desired
level. This knowledge about the system topology can be gained
by analyzing measurements [20]–[24]. Such types of attacks
are called undetectable attacks [19] or stealth attacks [25],
[26]. Extensions of the classical residual-based methods have
been suggested, e.g. the work in [27] that compares the norms
of attacked states against those of unattacked ones, or the work
of [28] that proposes an adapted cumulative sum method, but
these, too, cannot overcome the model’s inherent limitations
in its detection capabilities of such attacks.
Seeking to derive ways of rendering the smart grid robust to
FDI attacks, the authors of [14] review major types of defense
strategies, such as data authentication [15], and the inclusion
of time synchronized phasor measurement units (PMUs) [29],
[30]. In these works, the measurements originating from PMUs
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
04
89
4v
4 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  2
3 A
ug
 20
19
2are considered to be protected against attacks, and thus can
be used as a trustworthy reference. However, these methods
would require the placement of additional expensive hardware
into the grid infrastructure.
Approaches based on data analytics, on the other hand,
try to detect the presence of bad data or FDI attacks by
analyzing the measurements and the outcome of the PSSE,
while not requiring new hardware. In [31] the authors propose
a method to detect previously unobservable attacks, but their
approach is limited to sparse attacks where the measurement
devices are only compromised temporarily. In [29] the residual
evaluation is done between two consecutive time steps, thus
facilitating the detection of unobsorvable attacks. However,
this approach is easily corrupted, especially if the attack is
launched with small gradual changes. Other detection methods
for undetectable FDI attacks require reliable load forecasts
[30], or explore machine learning concepts [32]. The main
problem with machine learning approaches, such as in [32], is
that they need a large data set of historic grid states that also
contains attacked states. This can be very difficult to provide.
Finally, in [33] and [34], signals originating from hardware
components and from the process level, respectively, are used
to detect unobservable FDI attacks, but these solutions are
very specific to the hardware and protocols used in the power
system.
Most of the aforementioned works, notably [27]–[32], [35],
rely on the linearized DC model to describe the electrical
behavior of the power system. However, since the DC model is
only a simplification of the more realistic and more accurate
AC model, this is a significant shortcoming with regard to
the vulnerability analysis [11]. Since the construction of an
undetectable attack based on the AC model requires that the
attacker has far more knowledge and can solve non-convex
optimization problems [11], [27], detection methods for AC
model-based FDI attacks have not been extensively studied yet
(see, e.g. [36]). Nevertheless, several contributions that show
how an attacker could construct undetectable attacks based on
the AC model do exist (see, e.g. [11], [27], [37], [38]).
In recent years, the research field of graph signal processing
(GSP) has emerged. The key idea of GSP is to extend the
concepts of digital signal processing (DSP) to data connected
on graphs [39]–[43]. This enables the definition of classic
signal processing concepts, such as filtering, sampling, and
modulation, for signals related to an underlying graph structure
[39]. Previously, GSP has been applied to various fields, such
as sensor networks, biological networks, image processing,
machine learning, and data science [43], [44]. However, GSP
has rarely been applied in the context of power systems (see,
e.g. [45], where it is used to disaggregate the total load of one
power measurement).
In this paper, we consider the detection of FDI attacks in
power systems based on the output of the PSSE. We use the
concept of the graph Fourier transform (GFT), originating
from GSP and inspired by the work presented in [40] that
detects anomalies in a network of temperature sensors. By
relying on the electrical properties of the power system, which
can be interpreted as an undirected graph, we design a new
detection method that is not limited by fundamental unobserv-
abilities that originate from the simple linear equations of the
system and, thus, can detect unobservable attacks.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we propose
a statistical model of the output of general PSSE, which can be
based on any type of measurement, including measurements
form smart meters or PMUs. Second, this approach relies on
the AC power system model and, thus, facilitates the detection
of attacks on both voltage angle and magnitude. Third, we
derive a new method to detect previously undetectable FDI
attacks in power systems. The proposed method is based on
filtering the graph Fourier transformed estimated grid state.
This filter is designed as a high-pass filter in the sense of
graph frequencies. Then, by comparing the maximum norm
of the filtered signal with a threshold, the presence of FDI
attacks is discovered. In addition, the influence of the graph
smoothness on the detection of FDI attacks is investigated.
Finally, we conduct numerical simulations on the IEEE 14-bus
test case that demonstrate that the proposed method is able to
detect previously undetectable attacks. A preliminary version
of this approach, which is limited to the DC model and to the
detection of voltage angles and without the derivations of the
cutoff frequency of the filter and the detection threshold has
been published in [46].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we introduce the mathematical modeling of the
power system and the FDI attacks. The use of GSP concepts
for FDI attack detection is presented in Section III. Several
case studies in Section IV show the successful implementation
of the proposed method. In Section V the results of the case
studies are examined in detail and the use of the proposed
method for the DC power flow model is outlined. The paper
ends with conclusions in Section VI.
II. POWER SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELING
In this section, we first model the power system as an
undirected graph in Subsection II-A. In Subsection II-B we
present the AC power flow model used in this paper. The
considered FDI attack detection is presented in Subsection II-C
in the form of a hypothesis testing problem.
A. Graph Representation of Power System
The power system can be represented by an undirected
graph, G = (X,E), where X = {1, 2, . . . ,M} is a set of
M nodes that represent the buses with connected loads or
generators, and E = {(ek,l)} is a set of edges connecting the
buses, in which ek,l represents the transmission line between
bus k and bus l, for any k, l ∈ X where there is a transmission
line between those buses. As the electric characteristic of a
line is independent of the direction of the current that goes
through it, the graph is assumed to be undirected [13]. Such
finite graph structures are described by a weighted Laplacian
matrix, Y, with the following (k, l)-th element
Yk,l =

∑
Ek
yk,m, k = l
−yk,l, k 6= l and there exists ek,l
0, otherwise
, (1)
3Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus system based on [48]. Circles represent sample power
measurements and rectangles represent sample voltage measurements.
where Ek = {ek,m ∈ E,m = 1, 2, . . . ,M}, and yk,l is
the weight assigned to the connection between node k and
node l. In the power system context, this weight represents
the electrical admittance, yk,l, of the particular transmission
line, and Y is also called the admittance matrix. Thus, the
matrix Y depends on the topology of the grid, as well as on
the admittance values of the lines. With regard to the modeling
of the electrical behavior of the power system via the power
flow equations, one can distinguish between the approximated
linearized DC power flow model and the more accurate non-
linear AC model [47]. In the following, the AC model is
considered. A summary of how to use the proposed method
on the DC model is given in Subsection V-C.
To visualize this step, Fig. 1 gives the one-line diagram
of the IEEE 14 bus system, which is a well-known test grid
for power system applications. It is used as the basis for our
case studies in Section IV. Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) give the graph
representation of this grid.
B. AC Model
The goal of the AC power flow analysis is to compute the
complex voltages at each bus in steady-state conditions [47].
These voltage values are considered to be the system state
of the power system. The AC power flow equations can be
written in matrix form as follows:
i = Yv, (2)
where i = [i1, i2, . . . , iM ]
T ∈ CM is the vector of currents at
the M buses, v = [v1, v2, . . . , vM ]
T ∈ CM is the vector of bus
voltages, and Y ∈ CM×M is the admittance matrix, as defined
in (1). The vector of the complex bus currents, i, is related to
the apparent power (either load or generator) attached to the
buses, s = [s1, s2, . . . , sM ]
T ∈ CM , according to
s = diag(v)i∗, (3)
where i∗ is the complex conjugate of the vector of bus currents.
Inserting (2) into (3) results in
s = diag(v) (Yv)∗ . (4)
This reveals that the AC power flow model is non-linear
and non-convex, and, thus, it is usually solved by numerical
methods.
Generally, the complex voltage at the m-th bus in polar form
is given by vm = Vmejϕm ∀ m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where Vm is
the voltage magnitude in per unit (p.u.) and ϕm is the voltage
angle or phase. Neglecting the phase shift and off nominal
turns ratio (tap) of transformers, as well as the capacitive shunt
reactances of lines, the admittance, yk,l, of each line in the
electric grid is described by
yk,l =
1
rk,l + jxk,l
, ∀ek,l ∈ E, (5)
where rk,l and xk,l denote the electrical resistance and re-
actance, respectively. By substituting (5) in (1) we obtain
the admittance matrix for the AC model, Y, which can be
interpreted as a complex, non-Hermitian Laplacian matrix.
Thus, under the AC model, the eigenvalues of Y generally
have complex values that do not have a partial order [49].
The definition of ordering of the eigenvalues in this case is a
theoretical open question in GSP [39], [40], [43]. To overcome
the problem of complex ordering in this paper, we propose to
decompose the complex matrix Y as follows:
Y = YR + jYJ, (6)
where YR ∈ RM×M and YJ ∈ RM×M are the real and
imaginary parts of Y, respectively. By substituting (6) into
(2) we obtain
i = YRvR + jYJvR + jYRvJ −YJvJ, (7)
where vR and vJ are the real and imaginary parts of v,
respectively, such that v = vR + jvJ. The matrices YR and
−YJ are both real Laplacian matrices.
C. Hypothesis Testing
In the following, it is assumed that an attacker launches an
undetectable FDI attack by tampering with some of the mea-
surements of the power system. We assume that this attack can
be on any type of measurement that is used as an input to the
PSSE, such as classic measurements available in the SCADA,
such as line power and current flows, power injection at the
buses and bus voltage magnitudes, but also bus voltage angles
originating from PMUs, and power consumption originating
from smart meters. Thus, an advantage of the considered
model is that it is not limited to specific measurements and
can be used for both smart and traditional systems. The PSSE
uses the measurements and calculates the system state, v̂, i.e.
the voltage angle and magnitude for every bus in the power
system. As the attack is assumed to be undetectable for classic
approaches, it bypasses the PSSE and the residual-based bad
data detection. Therefore, in this work we consider that the
output of the PSSE is given by
v̂ = v + e + c, (8)
where v is the true unknown value of the bus voltage vector,
e is the error of the PSSE, which is assumed to be a zero-
mean Gaussian noise vector with known variance, σ2e , and
4measurements
PSSE
residual-based bad
data detection
bad data detected
GSP based FDI
attack detection
FDI attack
detected
v̂raw v̂
Fig. 2. Conceptional PSSE and bad data detection routine supplemented by
the proposed FDI attack detection method.
c ∈ CM is an arbitrary vector defining the impact of the attack.
If c = 0, there is no attack. It should be emphasized that while
FDI attacks are usually considered to be sparse attacks [27],
[31], [50], in the sense that attacks are launched only at a
few buses, here, the attack vector c is not necessarily sparse,
since it represents the influence of the attack on the PSSE. The
PSSE output in (8) is very general and can be obtained using
any existing PSSE method. That is, in this paper we take the
PSSE for granted and use its result to detect the attacks. Fig. 2
illustrates the standard PSSE and bad data detection routine
with an additional FDI attack detection method.
The task of detecting an FDI attack based on the PSSE
output is equivalent to making the decision if c = 0 in (8).
In hypothesis testing formulation, we consider the following
problem: {
H0 : c = 0
H1 : c 6= 0,
(9)
where H0 represents the hypothesis of no attack and H1
represents the hypothesis of an FDI attack. Since we do not
know the true value of v in (8), we cannot distinguish between
v and v + c and, thus, this type of attack cannot be detected
by likelihood ratio tests. In this paper, we rely on the inherent
graph structure of the electrical properties of the grid to gain
additional insights into the situation and to overcome this
limitation.
III. FDI ATTACK DETECTION
In this section we develop a novel method for the detection
of unobservable FDI attacks. As this approach requires real
Laplacian matrices as inputs, each of the terms in (7) needs
to be investigated independently. For the sake of simplicity of
presentation, all the following derivations are presented for
the first term in (7), taking the real part of the Laplacian
matrix, YR, and the real part of the voltage vector, vR. For
the other three terms the approach is analogous, and comprises
the following steps: After verifying the small total variation
of the graph (see Subsection III-A) and the eigendecompo-
sition, the first step is to calculate the GFT, as described
in Subsection III-B. The second step is to design the graph
high-pass filter (GHPF), as described in Subsection III-C. The
third step is the thresholding and detection, as described in
Subsection III-D.
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Fig. 3. Graph representation of IEEE 14-bus system from Fig. 1. The node
color represents the local variation as defined in (11). In Fig. 3(a) the grid is
not under attack, while in Fig. 3(b) node 5 is attacked.
A. Smooth Graphs
The smoothness of a signal defined on graph vertices can
be measured by the total variation [39], [51]:
S
(
v̂R
)
=
1
2
∑
k∈X
Sk
(
v̂R
)
, (10)
where
Sk
(
v̂R
)
=
∑
l∈Nk
YRk,l
(
v̂Rk − v̂Rl
)2
(11)
is the local variation at vertex k. It can be seen that Sk is a
function of all differences between the state of bus k and the
states of all its neighboring buses, l ∈ Nk, normalized by the
particular entry of the admittance matrix, Yk,l. The smaller
the total variation is, the smoother is the signal defined on the
graph. A sufficient smoothness of the undisturbed signal is a
necessary condition for detection after high-pass filtering. The
total variation can also be an indicator of the presence of bad
data or FDI attacks, as such disturbances tend to increase the
total variation defined in (10). As a visualization, in Figs. 3(a)
and 3(b) the grid of the IEEE 14-bus system is represented
as a graph. The color of the node indicates the variation per
node, Sk, as defined in (11), for an unattacked (Fig. 3(a))
and an attacked (Fig. 3(b)) grid state. It can be seen that the
unattacked grid is much smoother than the attacked grid.
5B. Graph Fourier Transform (GFT)
The eigendecomposition of the real, symmetric positive-
semidefinite matrix YR defined in Subsection II-B results in
a set of ordered real eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . , λM that satisfy
0 = λ1 < λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λM , (12)
and a set of orthonormal eigenvectors U = [u1,u2, . . . ,uM ]
that satisfy the following matrix decomposition:
YR = URΛR
(
UR
)T
, (13)
where ΛR is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues from (12).
In the context of GSP, the operation of (13) is referred to as
spectral decomposition of the matrix YR, the eigenvectors are
called the spectral components and the eigenvalues can be
interpreted as the graph frequencies [43]. The ordering of the
real eigenvalues in (12) represents the ordering of the graph
frequencies, ranging from low to high frequencies.
Based on the decomposition in (13), the GFT of the signal
v̂R is defined as
FR{v̂R} =
(
UR
)T
v̂R, (14)
and the resulting signal, FR{v̂R}, has properties analogous to
the Fourier transform of classic signals [43], [51]. In particular,
for signals with a small total variation, i.e. high smoothness,
the graph Fourier coefficients, i.e. the elements of the GFT
vector defined in (14), decay with increasing graph frequency,
having the largest contributions in the low-frequency compo-
nents [39]. The major assumption that enables the detection
of FDI attacks based on the proposed approach is that for
an attacked state the Fourier coefficients no longer decay, but
they cause peaks in the high-frequency range of the Fourier
coefficients.
C. Filter Design: Graph High-Pass Filter (GHPF)
Analogous to classical DSP theory, a graph filter is a
system that takes a graph signal as an input, processes it, and
produces another graph signal as an output. In the following,
we consider polynomial graph filters that take the form [52]:
h
(
YR
)
= h0I + h1Y
R + · · ·+ hL
(
YR
)L
, (15)
where h is the transfer function of the filter and L is the degree
of the filter. By substituting the decomposition from (13) in
(15) we obtain:
h
(
YR
)
= URh
(
ΛR
) (
UR
)T
, (16)
where
h (λi) = h0 + h1λi + · · ·+ hLλLi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M. (17)
The output of the filter in (16) is the signal:
ψ̂
R
= h
(
YR
)
v̂R. (18)
Therefore, according to (14), by multiplying (18) on the left
by
(
UR
)T
the GFT of the output in (18) satisfies
FR{ψ̂
R} = (UR)T h (YR) v̂R. (19)
Now, by substituting (14) and (16) in (19) and using the fact
that for eigenvector matrices UTU = I, one obtains:
FR{ψ̂
R} = h (ΛR)FR{v̂R}. (20)
The frequency response of a GHPF with the cutoff fre-
quency λcut is defined as follows:
h (λi) =
{
0, λi ≤ λcut
1, λi > λcut
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M. (21)
The choice of λcut is defined by (27) and further explained in
Subsection III-D.
The construction of a filter with the frequency response of
(21) in the form of (17), which is polynomial of degree L,
corresponds to solving a system of the following M linear
equations:
h0 + h1λ+ · · ·+ hLλL = 1λ>λcut , (22)
where 1A is the indicator function of the event A. By solving
these linear equations the L + 1 unknown coefficients of the
filter h can be obtained. In this work the filter is designed with
L+1 = M . This choice results in a single exact solution. The
idea of this GHPF is to extract the high-frequency components
of FR{v̂R} that contain information about the presence of FDI
attacks.
D. Detection Method
To detect the presence of FDI attacks, we use the GHPF
described in Subsection III-C to extract the high-frequency
components of the graph signal, and then threshold it. If one
or more of the Fourier transform coefficients defined in (20)
exceeds the threshold value, we conclude that there is an
attack. That is, the maximum absolute element of FR{ψ̂
R},
ΨRR =
∣∣∣∣∣∣FR{ψ̂R}∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ , (23)
is compared to a threshold, τ . Two alternative procedures to
set the threshold are described in the following:
1) Maximum Threshold: In [40] the threshold is defined as
the maximum from a set of historic states:
τmax
4
= max{Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,ΨN}, (24)
where N is the number of historic states. Transferred to
the application in power systems, the detection threshold
τmax is thus the maximum of all ΨRR that can be calculated
according to Algorithm 1 based on a list of historic grid states[
v̂R1 , v̂
R
2 , . . . , v̂
R
N
]
.
2) Averaged threshold: In [53] the threshold is defined as
the average of historic states plus a deviation term to set the
size of the confidence interval as follows:
τRR =
1
N
N∑
k=1
(
ΨRR
)
k
+ σRΨασ, (25)
where σRΨ is the standard deviation between the
(
ΨRR
)
k
. The
parameter ασ is a tuning parameter that allows the choice of
the confidence interval.
6The averaged threshold from (25) is statistically more robust
to outliers than the maximum threshold from (24). Consis-
tently, our simulations showed that, indeed, the threshold
value from (25) led to better results than the one from (24).
Therefore, in the case studies in Section IV, the definition of
τRR in (25) is applied.
In order to use the total variation, S
(
v̂R
)
, as an indicator
for the presence of FDI attacks, the detection threshold is con-
structed by sustituting ΨRR by the smoothness of the historical
states, S
(
v̂R
)
in (25):
τRS =
1
N
N∑
k=1
[
S
(
v̂Rk
)]
+ σRSασ,S , (26)
using the mean value of all total variations derived from the
historic grid states according to (10), and where σRS is the
standard deviation between the variations of different historical
sates scaled by the parameter ασ,S that defines the confidence
interval.
The precision of the propsed FDI attack detection method
strongly depends on the choice of the cutoff frequency, λcut.
If the frequency band extends too far into the low-frequency
part of the spectrum, normal grid states can also contribute
with a high amplitude. On the other hand, if the frequency
band is too small, attacks might pass undetected. In this work,
the cutoff frequency is chosen such that for undisturbed states
the contribution that is given by Fourier components above
this frequency is smaller than 0.1 %. To find the threshold, we
rely on concepts of graph spectral compression [54]. There, the
approximation error Rγ that results from cutting off all high-
frequency components above the γ-th frequency is defined as
Rγ =
M∑
m=γ
∣∣FR{v̂R} (λm)∣∣2 . (27)
In [54], this equation is used to compress and approximate the
signal. In this work, we fix Rγ to a desired value and iteratively
decrease γ until further decrease would lead to the situation
where the right hand side of (27) would be larger than the
fixed Rγ . The cutoff frequency then is given by λγ .
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed approach of applying
a GHPF on an arbitrary signal to obtain the maximum norm of
its high-frequency components. The overall proposed detection
procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. This algorithm
consists of applying Algorithm 1 on all four terms of (7).
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, the proposed approach is applied and inves-
tigated on the IEEE 14-bus test grid. This test grid is often
used in the context of FDI attack detection [27], [29], [30]
and attack construction [35], [38]. The voltage angles and
magnitudes of this grid are calculated from the AC power
flow solver implemented by the pandapower-tool [55]. Bus
number 1 is set to be the slack bus. In the following, several
different test cases are investigated. In Subsection IV-A the
total variation of undisturbed grid states is investigated. Sub-
section IV-B investigates attacks on the voltage and magnitude
separately, while applying different threshold definitions. In
Algorithm 1: GFT and GHPF design for general input.
Input: • real Laplacian matrix L
• state vector s
• maximal approximation error γ
• list of historic states [s1, s2, . . . , sN ]
• confidence interval ασ
Output: Ψ, τ
1) calculate eigenvalue decomposition of L = UΛUT to
get the matrix of eigenvectors U and the eigenvalues
λ1, λ2, . . . , λM
2) calculate GFT F{s} = UT s
3) construct polynomial matrix M where
Mi =
[
1, λi, . . . , λ
L
i
]
4) find cutoff frequency λcut based on maximal
approximation error γ =
∑M
m=γ |F{s} (λm)|2
5) solve linear equation Mh = 1λ>λcut to find
h = [h0, h1, . . . , hL]
T
6) apply filter F{s˜} = h (Λ)F{s}
7) calculate maximum norm Ψ = ||F{s˜}||∞
8) based on historic states, calculate detection threshold
τ = µΨ + σΨασ , where Ψk = ||h (Λ)F{sk}||∞ and
µΨ is the mean and σΨ the standard deviation of all
Ψk
9) return Ψ, τ
Subsection IV-C we investigate the robustness of our method
against state estimation noise, and in Subsection IV-D a
constructed undetectable FDI attack that combines attacks on
the angle and magnitude is launched and detected. Finally, in
Subsection IV-E the performance of the proposed method is
compared with that of previous works.
A. Test Case 1: Total Variation of Undisturbed Grid States
In this test case, the total variation of the standard load
situation is calculated using (10), normalized by the number
of buses in the grid, M , and shown in Table I for IEEE 14-bus,
24-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus test grids [55]. It can be seen that
the real part of the graph signal has a smaller total variation,
and thus is smoother than the imaginary part.
For the IEEE 14-bus test grid, the smoothness of the real
and imaginary parts, S
(
v̂R
)
and S
(
v̂J
)
, are visualized by
plotting the frequency response calculated using (14) of the
two signals FR{v̂R} and FJ{v̂J}, as shown in Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5. These figures validate the decaying characteristic of
the Fourier components, and show that FR{v̂R} is smoother
than FJ{v̂J}. Only the contributions lying above the cutoff
frequency λcut pass the high-pass filter and are used for the
detection. In Subsection III-B it is claimed that FDI attacks
destroy this decaying behavior. This is visualized, for example,
in Fig. 5 with FJ{v̂J}FDI for an angle attack of 10 ◦ on bus
number 9. In this figure, and throughout, the graph frequencies
are normalized: λi = λi|λmax| , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
B. Test Case 2: Voltage Angle and Magnitude Attack
In this test case, the effects of undetectable sparse attacks
are systematically investigated for attacks on the voltage
7Algorithm 2: FDI attack detection for AC model based
on GSP.
Input: • admittance matrix of the grid in the form of a
Laplacian matrix Y
• vector of estimated bus voltages v̂
• maximal error Rγ , 
J
γ
• list of historic grid states [v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂N ]
• confidence interval ασ
Output: H0 or H1
1) YR = Re (Y) and YJ = −Im (Y)
2) v̂R = Re (v̂) and v̂J = Im (v̂)
3) apply Algorithm 1 on YR, v̂R, Rγ ,
[
v̂R1 , v̂
R
2 , . . . , v̂
R
N
]
,
ασ to obtain ΨRR, τ
R
R
4) apply Algorithm 1 on YJ, v̂R, Rγ ,
[
v̂R1 , v̂
R
2 , . . . , v̂
R
N
]
,
ασ to obtain ΨRJ , τ
R
J
5) apply Algorithm 1 on YJ, v̂J, Jγ ,
[
v̂J1, v̂
J
2, . . . , v̂
J
N
]
,
ασ to obtain ΨJJ, τ
J
J
6) apply Algorithm 1 on YR, v̂J, Jγ ,
[
v̂J1, v̂
J
2, . . . , v̂
J
N
]
,
ασ to obtain ΨJR, τ
J
R
7) if (ΨRR > τRR ) ∨ (ΨJJ > τ JJ ) ∨ (ΨJR > τ JR) ∨ (ΨRJ > τRJ )
then
return H1
else
return H0
end
TABLE I
SMOOTHNESS MEASURED AS TOTAL VARIATION OF STANDARD LOAD
SITUATION IN SEVERAL IEEE TEST CASES.
S(v̂R)
M
S(v̂J)
M
IEEE-14 0.13 3.48
IEEE-24 0.16 17.98
IEEE-30 0.04 0.18
IEEE-118 0.11 5.82
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Fig. 4. Frequency response of the real part, FR{v̂R}, of a valid grid state.
magnitude and angle separately on all buses of the grid (except
the slack bus), k = 2, 3, . . . ,M . The construction of such an
attack on the angle is described in [27], and, similarly, the
description given in [37] is used to construct an attack on
the voltage magnitude. In particular, the attack is realized by
modifying either the magnitude Vk or the angle ϕk according
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Fig. 5. Frequency response of the imaginary part, FJ{v̂J}, of a valid grid
state, as well as the frequency response of a state subject to an FDI attack,
FJ{v̂J}FDI.
to (8) by adding a certain offset v̂k,FDI = v̂k + c with
c = Ake
jak , where the attack on the angle is ak and the attack
on the magnitude is Ak. Specifically, ak ∈ [−12,−11, . . . , 12]
degrees and Ak ∈ [−0.2,−0.18, . . . , 0.2] p.u.. Every attack
is executed by 100 Monte Carlo simulations of randomly
generated grid states following
Pk = P
0
k |yP|
Qk = Q
0
k |yQ|
, (28)
where yP, yQ are Gaussian random variables with mean 1 and
variance σ2. The terms P 0k and Q
0
k are the nominal active
and reactive loads, respectively, for bus k, as given in the
test case. For the GFT and subsequent filtering, the cutoff
frequency, λcut, is found by allowing an approximation error
of Rγ = 0.0001 and 
J
γ = 0.001 based on (27) and the approach
explained there. As the graph is smoother for the real than for
the imaginary part, as shown in Table I, the error is chosen to
be smaller for the real part than for the imaginary part.
To generate the required historic data, the loads of the grid
are again randomly scaled following (28). Then, an AC power
that provides the grid states, [v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂N ] is performed.
The results of these tests are summarized in Figs. 6 and 7
for attacks on the angle and on the magnitude, respectively.
The curves related to ασ,S show the detection based on the
smoothness threshold from (26), while the others show the
detection based on GFT from (25) for various values of ασ .
These figures show the probability that an FDI attack, with
an impact exceeding a particular angle ak or magnitude Ak,
is detected by the proposed method for any attacked bus. It
should be noted that the detection probability at the point of
∆ = 0, i.e. when there is no attack, gives the false alarm rate.
Thus, the choice of ασ from (25) directly determines the false
alarm rate. For example, in Fig. 6 the false alarm probabilities
are roughly 0.5, 0.3 and 0.05 for ασ = 0.5, 1, 2. According to
(25), ασ scales the confidence interval around the mean value.
Thus, the false alarm rate is of the order of magnitude of the
percentage of values of a normal distribution that lie outside
the confidence interval.
In Table II the contributions of the different terms of (7) to
the attack detection are listed. It can be seen from this that
both the analysis related to the real part of the state vector,
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Fig. 6. Test case 2: Detection probability for FDI attacks that exceed a
particular change of angle. The size of the confidence interval is scaled with
ασ , as defined in (25).
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Fig. 7. Test case 2: Detection probability for FDI attacks that exceed a
particular change of magnitude. The size of the confidence interval is scaled
with ασ , as defined in (25).
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF DETECTED ATTACKS THAT ARE DETECTED BY THE REAL
OR THE IMAGINARY PART OF THE STATE VECTOR.(
ΨRR ∨ΨRJ
) ∧ (ΨJJ ∨ΨJR) ΨRR ∨ΨRJ ΨJJ ∨ΨJR
Angle attack 17 % 18 % 65 %
Magnitude attack 1 % 97 % 2 %
ΨRR and Ψ
R
J , as well as to the imaginary part, Ψ
J
J and Ψ
J
R,
contribute to the detection. Attacks on the angle are mostly
detected by the imaginary part of the voltage vector, while
attacks on the voltage magnitude are, largely, detected by the
real part of the voltage vector. This behavior is explained in
Subsection V-B.
C. Test Case 3: Robustness against State Estimation Errors
According to (8), the estimated grid state, v̂, is influenced
not only by a possible attack vector, c but also by random
noise, e, that results from the measurement errors in the state
estimation. In order to validate the robustness of the proposed
method against this noise term, we added noise vectors with
varying standard deviations, σe, to the voltage vector before
simulating the attacks as described in the previous test case.
Since the standard deviations of noise errors in PSSE are often
considered to be around σe = 0.001 [30], in our simulations
we assumed standard deviations of σe = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01.
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Fig. 8. Test case 3: Detection probability for FDI attacks that exceed a
particular change of angle with varying noise variance.
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Fig. 9. Test case 3: Detection probability for FDI attacks that exceed a
particular change of magnitude with varying noise variance.
The results of these simulations can be found in Figs. 8 and
9. These figures show that the proposed detection method is,
in fact very, robust against state estimation noises, even for
standard deviations that are larger as generally assumed.
D. Test Case 4: Wide Scale Undetectable FDI Attack
This test case relies on the constructed undetectable FDI
attack proposed in [38]. Based on the IEEE-14 bus sytem, the
authors provide two data sets, one for an undisturbed case and
one for an attack on the buses 6 and 9 - 14. Both the angle
and the magnitude of these bus voltages have been tampered
with. For the detection, the same parameters are used as in the
previous test cases with ασ = 2. Fig. 10 shows the Fourier
transformed and filtered components of the imaginary part of
the voltage FJ{ψ̂
J}, both for the undisturbed case and for the
undetectable FDI attack, based on the imaginary part of the
Laplacian matrix, YJ. For the latter, the detection threshold τ JJ
is exceeded and, thus, the undetectable FDI attack is detected.
E. Comparison with other Approaches
The aim of this subsection is to compare the behavior of
previous works with the results we obtained in our case study
in Subsection IV-B.
The detection method in [27] is based on an “energy
residue” heuristic. In order to compare this method with the
method proposed herein, we implemented it comparing the
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Fig. 10. Test case 4: Frequency response of FJ{ψ̂J} with and without
undetectable FDI attack. For the attacked case, FJ{ψ̂J}FDI, the threshold τ JJ
is exceeded.
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Fig. 11. Comparison between the proposed method based on GSP and two
previously published methods, one based on the norm of the grid state,‖v̂t‖
and the other based on the norm of the residual between two consecutive grid
states, ‖v̂t − v̂t−1‖.
norm of the grid state, ‖v̂t‖ , with a threshold, which was set
such that the false alarm rate is equal to the outcome of the
proposed method.
We also implemented an adapted version of the work pro-
posed in [29], which is based on a residual evaluation between
the grid states of two consecutive time steps, ‖v̂t − v̂t−1‖.
This residual is then compared with a threshold. We again
chose the threshold such that the false alarm rate is equal
to the outcome of the proposed method. Fig. 11 shows the
comparison between the three detection methods for attacks on
the voltage angle. It can be seen that the first method is unable
to detect the attacks, while the second approach based on the
residual between two time steps, only succeeds in detecting
very strong attacks.
V. REMARKS
In this section, we discuss some aspects and characteristics
of the proposed method that emerged from the case studies.
In Subsection V-C we also summarize the application of the
FDI attack detection method on the DC model.
A. Detection Characteristics
The case studies in the previous section demonstrate that we
are able to detect previously undetectable attacks. However, it
can be verified that attacks on some of the buses are better
detected than attacks on others, even if they have the same
impact. This behavior can be explained by looking at the
diagonal elements of Y. As given in (1), the diagonal elements
in the Laplacian matrix, Yk,k, sum up the weights of all
edges connected to node k. The smaller this value is, the
more “loosely” coupled is the bus. For such buses, even large
differences between v̂k and v̂l do not contribute significantly
to the total variation as it is defined in (10). In summary, for
buses with small diagonal values in Y compared to the other
buses, attacks are the most difficult to detect.
For detection based on the smoothness, the boundary con-
dition for detectability is given by (10). As long as the attack
does not increase S, it cannot be detected.
B. Contribution of Real and Imaginary Parts
Table II summarizes the second case study and shows that
attacks on the magnitude are mainly detected by ΨRR or Ψ
R
J ,
both of which are related to the real part of the voltage vector.
Attacks on the angle are mainly detected by ΨJJ or Ψ
J
R that
are related to the imaginary part of the voltage vector. This
behavior can be explained by writing the complex voltage in
the Cartesian and the Euler formulations:
v = vR + jvJ = V cosϕ+ jV sinϕ. (29)
Applying the small angle approximation in (29), i.e. sinϕ ≈ ϕ
and cosϕ ≈ 1, leads to the following relation:
v ≈ V + jϕ. (30)
Thus, FDI attacks on the magnitude mainly influence the real
part and thus, can be best detected by the real part, while FDI
attacks on the angle mainly affect the imaginary part of the
voltage and thus, can be best detected by the imaginary part.
C. FDI Attack Detection for the DC Model
The DC power flow model is based on the following
assumptions [47]:
• voltage magnitude is fixed at 1 p.u.,
• each line ek,l ∈ E is characterized by its reactance,
neglecting its resistance,
yk,l =
1
xk,l
, ∀ek,l ∈ E, (31)
• the angle difference between two connected buses is quite
small.
Under these assumptions, the vector of bus voltage angles,
ϕ = [ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕM ]
T ∈ RM , is linked to the vec-
tor of real power injection or consumption of the buses,
p = [P1, P2, . . . , PM ]
T ∈ RM , according to
p = YDCϕ, (32)
where YDC ∈ RM×M is the admittance matrix for the
DC model. In this case, the matrix YDC is a real, sym-
metric, positive-semidefinite matrix, which takes the form
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of a weighted Laplacian matrix, as defined in (1), with the
elements defined in (31). The proposed approach for FDI
attack detection can be applied to the DC model. The details
and a full algorithm for the DC model case can be found in
our preliminary work [46].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a novel method for the detection
of FDI attacks in power systems, which relies on the inherent
graph structure of the grid. The proposed method uses the AC
model as a basis to describe the electrical behavior of the grid
and its associated graph representation in the form of a Lapla-
cian matrix. The method is based on performing a GFT and
filtering the high-frequency components associated with the
large eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix. Large contributions
in the high-frequency range indicate the existence of anomalies
or malicious FDI attacks. Extensive case studies show that
the graph signals originating from power systems exhibit
the required decaying behavior in their Fourier components.
This concentration within the low-frequency components is
destroyed for grid states originating from FDI attacks. This
facilitates the detection of previously undetectable attacks
based on the high-frequency content.
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